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COMMENT 
THE FATCA PROVISIONS OF THE HIRE ACT:  
BOLDLY GOING WHERE NO WITHHOLDING HAS 
GONE BEFORE 
Melissa A. Dizdarevic*
 
 
In an effort to crack down on offshore tax evasion, the United States is 
implementing a new set of information reporting and withholding 
requirements on foreign banks and other foreign entities.  These provisions, 
known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) provisions of 
the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, require thirty 
percent withholding of the entity’s U.S.-source income, unless they disclose 
specific information regarding their customers’ identities and account 
balances.  While this may be an effective way to force foreign institutions 
into compliance, it also raises questions about how it will function within 
existing tax reporting systems, where the function of withholding serves a 
materially different purpose. 
The FATCA reporting and withholding provisions depart from the norm 
of using withholding as a tax enforcement mechanism, and instead use it as 
a coercive compliance measure.  This Comment looks to current domestic 
and international withholding systems as a point of comparison for this new 
regime.  By examining the objectives and operation of these existing 
systems as compared to those of FATCA, it becomes clear that withholding 
income serves a drastically different purpose.  Existing systems utilize 
withholding as a means of ensuring that taxes will be paid, while FATCA 
implements it as a way to force foreign banks to comply with a set of 
reporting requirements.  Considering this is the first time withholding 
appears to be used in this way, it is prudent to ask whether this is a 
desirable use of withholding in our current international taxation system.  
This Comment posits that, without significant revision to account for 
conflicts arising with pre-existing obligations, converting the accepted 
concept of withholding into a drastically different punitive measure is both 
undesirable and unacceptable. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Boston University.  
I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Linda Sugin, for her guidance.  I would also like 
to thank my family and friends for their steadfast love and support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Tentative Resolution Set in UBS Tax Evasion Case,”1 “Deutsche Bank 
Settles Tax Shelter Case for $553.6 mln,”2 “HSBC Clients Scrutinized in 
U.S. Tax Evasion Probe,”3 “Swiss Banker Pleads Guilty in U.S. Tax 
Case.”4  These are just a few of the recent headlines from some of the most 
high-profile U.S. offshore tax evasion cases.5  As part of the recent 
“crackdown” on tax evasion under the Obama Administration,6
 
 1. Lynnley Browning, Tentative Resolution Set in UBS Tax Evasion Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 2009, at B2. 
 charges 
 2. Deutsche Bank Settles Tax Shelter Case for $553.6 mln, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2010, http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/96076/20101229/deutsche-bank-settles-tax-shelter-
case-for-553-6-mln.htm#. 
 3. Clare Baldwin & Joe Rauch, HSBC Clients Scrutinized in U.S. Tax Evasion Probe, 
REUTERS, July 6, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE66608720100707. 
 4. Brent Kendall, Swiss Banker Pleads Guilty in U.S. Tax Case, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 
2010, at C3. 
 5. These articles focus on offshore tax evasion cases. See infra Part I.E.  For the most 
high-profile domestic income tax evaders, see Top 10 Tax Dodgers, TIME, 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1891335_1891333,00.html 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
 6. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET PROPOSAL 206–336 
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were brought against a number of foreign banks—UBS, LGT Bank of 
Liechtenstein,7 and Deutsche Bank, among others—for helping Americans 
dodge their taxes by using fraudulent tax shelters.8 After these cases were 
brought, however, it became clear that the problem might better be solved 
by prevention rather than by prosecution.  This is how the Foreign Account 
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was born.9  FATCA seeks to improve 
detection and further discourage tax evasion by implementing a new 
reporting and withholding system.10  While these goals are laudable, these 
new requirements are not without their consequences.11
Since their enactment in March 2010, the FATCA provisions of the 
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act have raised a number 
of questions as to how the requirements will function within existing 
information reporting and tax withholding systems.  Practitioners have 
questioned how the provisions will apply to their clients, noting the 
difficulties and burdens associated with pre-existing obligations under 
Qualified Intermediary (QI) agreements, and benefits agreed to under 
income tax treaties.
 
12  The IRS has also sought suggestions from the legal 
and tax communities to better offer guidance as to how the provisions will 
operate with existing systems when they go into effect.13
 
(Comm. Print 2010), available at http://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3704 (noting the various strategies by which 
international taxation can be better enforced); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON 
REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 9–12 (2009), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_version.pdf 
(explaining that underreporting of offshore income is a top priority of the Obama 
Administration and that the comprehensive approach includes legislative proposals, 
improved tax information exchange agreements, and increased enforcement); Lynnley 
Browning, I.R.S. Shift to Combat International Tax Evasion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2010, at 
B3 (describing recent IRS changes geared toward stronger focus on international tax evasion 
and third-party reporting). 
  Because the 
provisions are not yet in effect, many questions remain as to how they will 
operate. 
 7. 156 CONG. REC. S1745 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) 
(explaining recent tax evasion problems with such foreign banks, and emphasizing the need 
for legislation such as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)). 
 8. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Settles Tax Shelter Case for $553.6 mln, supra note 2. 
 9. The term “FATCA” is used colloquially to refer to the new legislation enacted as a 
part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act, and which now comprises 
Chapter 4 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). See infra note 145. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See, e.g., Alison Bennett, Tax Legislation:  Dozens of Stakeholders From Around 
Globe Raise Concerns on FATCA Regime, 29 Tax Mgmt. Wkly. Rep. (BNA) 1535 (Nov. 22, 
2010); Micah Bloomfield & Dmitriy Shamrakov, The Thirty Percent Solution?:  FATCA 
Provisions of the HIRE Act, STROOCK SPECIAL BULLETIN, Apr. 21, 2010, at 1; Dean Marsan, 
FATCA:  The Global Financial System Must Now Implement a New U.S. Reporting and 
Withholding System for Foreign Account Tax Compliance, Which Will Create Significant 
New Exposures—Managing This Risk (Part I), TAXES, July 2010, at 27; Morrison & 
Foerster, IRS Issues Initial Guidance on FATCA Withholding and Reporting, TAX TALK, Oct. 
2010, at 2. 
 13. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329 (providing some guidance as to 
grandfathered obligations and filing, and requesting comments on what provisions need 
further guidance). 
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This Comment examines the potentially problematic effects of the 
FATCA information reporting and withholding requirements on foreign 
institutions.  With the taxation goals of equity and efficiency in mind, this 
Comment focuses on FATCA’s information reporting requirements and 
penalty withholding tax in comparison to some of the reporting and 
withholding systems already in place in domestic and international taxation. 
More specifically, this Comment looks to the goals, methods, and policies 
of these systems, as compared to those of FATCA, to examine how the 
burdens and policies in force will change.  One example of such anticipated 
change arises in the context of withholding.  Under FATCA, unlike other 
withholding regimes, the tax withheld is not for the purpose of securing 
payment of the taxpayer’s liability, but rather as a penalty for failure to 
report.  This and other examples of uncommon usage of information 
reporting and withholding will show how FATCA uniquely crosses the 
policies of information reporting and withholding, and undercuts the 
policies upon which income tax treaties are made. 
Part I focuses on the background against which the FATCA provisions 
were enacted.  This includes an explanation of the problem of offshore tax 
evasion, and how withholding and information reporting systems have 
attempted to combat it.  In addition, Part I provides a brief explanation of 
the goals and functions of income tax treaties that have modified the 
standard international taxation rules.  Part II looks to the FATCA provisions 
themselves—the goals and the way the provisions are intended to apply.  
Part III then examines some of the problems involved in applying FATCA 
considering current U.S. withholding and information reporting systems.  
The first section of Part III considers withholding as a measure to coerce 
foreign financial institutions (FFIs) into agreements with the IRS.  The 
second section of Part III analyzes whether the FATCA reporting 
requirements are an efficient use of information reporting.  The third section 
examines the potentially dangerous reduction in treaty benefits to which 
many FFIs may be entitled.  This Comment suggests that, without further 
revision or guidance to account for these difficulties, the use of withholding 
as a punitive instrument is unwarranted. 
I.  THE TAX ENFORCEMENT ENTERPRISE 
In the United States, collection of federal income tax is based on a 
system of “voluntary compliance.”14  This means that initially it is up to the 
taxpayer, rather than the government, to determine and pay the appropriate 
amount of tax.15
 
 14. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 176 (1960) (holding that “[o]ur system of 
taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment, not upon distraint”). 
  However, the naturally competing goals of taxpayers 
 15. See Rev. Rul. 2007-20, 2007-14 I.R.B. 863.  “Voluntary compliance” thus does not 
mean that paying income tax is voluntary or optional. Id.  Rather, the requirements of filing 
tax returns are well established in the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 6011(a), 6012(a), 
6072(a) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-1(a) (1960).  Failure to meet these 
requirements will have consequences. See, e.g., United States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 542 
(10th Cir. 1986) (stating that “although Treasury regulations establish voluntary compliance 
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seeking to minimize their tax liability, and the government looking to 
maximize revenue, complicate tax enforcement.16
Noncompliance with tax obligations can occur in three ways—non-filing, 
underpayment, and underreporting of taxes due.
  The Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) has thus long been concerned with the enforcement of 
taxation so as to minimize noncompliance. 
17  These three components 
form the basis for the estimated tax gap, or the amount of tax that should 
have been paid but was not.18  As of 2006, the tax gap was estimated at 
around $345 billion.19  In an effort to close this gap, the IRS has used 
various methods and mechanisms tailored to the nature of the problem.  For 
example, punishment for nonfiling comes in the form of civil and criminal 
penalties.20  However, the problems of underpayment and underreporting 
are not so easily solved.21  Because underpayment is typically seen as a 
result of failure to set aside sufficient funds, the IRS has implemented a 
system of withholding at the source.22  In so doing, the time between the 
taxpayer receiving the payment and having to pay the tax is eliminated, so 
there is less opportunity to fail to pay.23  The problem of underreporting24
 
as the general method of income tax collection, Congress gave the Secretary of the Treasury 
the power to enforce the income tax laws through involuntary collection”). 
 
 16. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS:  INTERNATIONAL 
TAX AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 1 (2010).  Taxpayers minimizing their liability is considered 
“avoidance” and is encouraged. Id.  Avoidance usually refers to legal reductions in taxes, 
whereas evasion refers to illegal reductions. Id.  However, it is often the case that tax 
reductions are considered “avoidance” when they are actually “evasion.” Id.  For more on 
this distinction, and how it tends to blur, see id. 
 17. Tax Gap Facts and Figures, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., at 1, www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/tax_gap_facts-figures.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2011); see also Eric Toder, What Is The 
Tax Gap?, 117 TAX NOTES 367 (2007). 
 18. Toder, supra note 17, at 367.  The tax gap has been defined as “[t]he difference 
between the tax that taxpayers should pay and what they actually pay on a timely basis.” Tax 
Gap Facts and Figures, supra note 17, at 1 (emphasis omitted).  In other words, it is the 
amount by which taxpayers have failed to file and pay taxes on time. See Lily Kahng, 
Investment Income Withholding in the United States and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315, 
322–23 (2010). 
 19. This figure represents the gross tax gap, while $290 billion is the estimated net gap 
for 2001. Toder, supra note 17, at 367. 
 20. I.R.C. § 6651 (detailing penalty computations for an individual’s failure to file a tax 
return or pay tax); id. § 7203 (making it a misdemeanor to fail to file a tax return, supply 
certain information, or pay taxes due, punishable by fine and no more than one year 
imprisonment). 
 21. This is not to say that underpayment and underreporting are not subject to such 
penalties once they have been discovered. See id. § 6654 (penalties for an individual’s failure 
to pay income tax); id. § 6652 (penalties for failure to file certain information returns). 
 22. Historically, withholding was trumpeted as a way to help taxpayers pay their taxes, 
but it was noted in House hearings that withholding was really a way to get payment from 
those with little experience in setting aside finances to meet their obligations. See Charlotte 
Twight, Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding:  The Machinery of Institutional 
Change, 14 CATO J. 359, 370–71 (1995). 
 23. Id. 
 24. One third of the tax gap, or approximately $109 billion, is the result of individuals 
who underreport their income taxes. Toder, supra note 17, at 367. 
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has mainly been framed as an issue of unequal information.25  That is, while 
the taxpayer is in the position to know the transactions he was involved in, 
the government seeks to obtain this information to ensure appropriate tax 
payment after the fact.26  The resolution to this problem has primarily been 
through information reporting.27
It is evident from the information about the tax gap that voluntary 
compliance is insufficient to secure tax compliance.  Congress has thus 
sought to reinforce the system with the assistance of third parties.
 
28  Third 
parties are integral in the operation of withholding at the source and 
information reporting.29
In sum, there are two main areas in which the IRS has sought to enforce 
tax compliance:  first, in the voluntary nature of the payment of taxes, by 
withholding at the source of certain payments to eliminate the possibility of 
nonpayment; and second, by ensuring that the government has another 
source of information to compare against the taxpayer’s filings. 
 
A.  Taxpayer Evasive Action and Offshore Accounts 
Noncompliance has been an especially pronounced problem in 
international taxation.  A number of circumstances unique to international 
taxation make it an attractive way to avoid—and evade—taxes.  This is 
evidenced by the estimation that the amount of evaded international income 
tax is between $40 billion and $70 billion each year.30
There are several reasons offshore financial centers are conducive to tax 
evasion.
 
31  First, the tax laws and philosophies of different countries can 
differ considerably.32  Some countries do not impose an income tax because 
it is contrary to their policy; others levy a low rate of income tax, 
encouraging foreigners to receive and keep income there.33  Second, foreign 
laws regarding banking secrecy differ as well.34
 
 25. Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps To Reduce the Tax Gap:  When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1735 (2010). 
  Countries most conducive 
 26. Id. (citing Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties:  Ensuring Perceived 
Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1515, 1543–44). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Lederman, supra note 25, at 1737–38. 
 29. See id. 
 30. GRAVELLE, supra note 16, at 1 (citing Joseph Guttentag & Reuven Avi-Yonah, 
Closing the International Tax Gap, in ECON. POLICY INST., BRIDGING THE TAX GAP:  
ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 99, 101 (Max B. Sawicky ed., 
2005)). 
 31. Richard K. Gordon, On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law:  Global 
Governance and Offshore Financial Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 516 (2010). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (citing RICHARD A. GORDON, TAX HAVENS AND THEIR USE BY UNITED STATES 
TAXPAYERS—AN OVERVIEW 15, 17 (1981)).  Banking secrecy laws are beneficial to 
taxpayers seeking to avoid their resident country’s tax liability because banks would not be 
required to give their account holder’s information to a foreign government requesting it.  
Even in circumstances where banks are required to hand over such information—as per an 
information exchange agreement between the two nations—the information would be limited 
to that specifically requested.  Authorities in the United States would have no way of 
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to tax evasion will typically have banking secrecy laws that safeguard the 
identity of the account holder.35  Thus, a difficulty arises when one country 
seeks information that would require a foreign institution to violate its own 
country’s laws.  Some countries are known as “tax havens” precisely 
because of such low tax rates and banking secrecy laws.36
There are several common ways to avoid taxation by using such low tax, 
secretive jurisdictions.  Some are as simple as a taxpayer opening an 
account in a foreign bank.
 
37  When a third party diverts payments to this 
account, the interest income goes untaxed and the taxpayer does not report 
it to the domestic jurisdiction.38  Similarly, the income could simply be 
unreported in the taxpayer’s country of residence, and the low tax 
jurisdiction would not have to report it.39
B.  Harnessing Compliance Through Withholding at the Source 
 
1.  What Does It Mean To Withhold? 
The question of tax compliance has, in many cases, been put to rest by 
the implementation of the “devastatingly effective” mechanism of 
withholding at the source.40  Withholding is a relatively simple concept.  It 
requires the payor to retain a part of the payment and hand it over to the tax 
authorities, and is applied against the payee’s tax liability.41  In the common 
system of wage withholding,42 for example, this involves the employer 
holding back a part of the employee’s wages, and the amount withheld is 
then considered tax already paid by the employee.43
Modern wage withholding began during World War II, when revenue 
needs were high and volatile.
 
44  Withholding acted as an attractive way to 
ensure collection from “new taxpayers, who had no experience filing a tax 
return or putting funds aside for the payment of taxes.”45
 
knowing of the existence of such taxable income, let alone what information to request, or as 
to which taxpayers. Id. at 516–18. 
  One year after its 
introduction, praising taxpayer convenience and patriotic sacrifice, 
 35. Id. at 516 (citing GORDON, supra note 34, at 15, 17). 
 36. GORDON, supra note 34, at 3–5. 
 37. Gordon, supra note 31, at 516. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 516–18. 
 40. Kahng, supra note 18, at 322 (citing I.R.C. § 3402 (2006)); see also Twight, supra 
note 22, at 359 (noting that “withholding is the paramount administrative mechanism 
enabling the federal government to collect, without significant protest, sufficient private 
resources to fund a vastly expanded welfare state”). 
 41. Kahng, supra note 18, at 322. 
 42. See I.R.C. §§ 3401–3406 (regarding provisions of collection of income tax at the 
source of wages); see also id. § 3403 (making the employer liable for payment of the tax 
deducted and withheld). 
 43. Charlotte Twight describes withholding as the “extraction of income taxes from 
taxpayers’ pay envelopes before salaries were paid.” Twight, supra note 22, at 369. 
 44. Kahng, supra note 18, at 322–23 (citing Richard L. Doernberg, The Case Against 
Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595, 599–603 (1982)). 
 45. Id. 
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Congress enacted comprehensive wage withholding.46  In enacting wage 
withholding, Treasury officials insisted that the withholding requirement 
would not impose an additional tax burden, but instead would merely relate 
to the time and method of payment.47  However, in recognition of a time-
value problem where the government was getting the benefit of using the 
dollars before the tax was actually due, Treasury officials recommended 
that the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to pay interest on amounts 
refunded under the new law.48
This is precisely how the current withholding system works.  In the event 
that more tax has been withheld than required,
 
49 the government credits or 
refunds the balance, with interest.50  Though the government is granted a 
forty-five day “grace period,” any refunds made after that period must 
include interest.51
2.  Current Withholding Systems 
  This provision was presumably intended to account for 
the time-value problem of the taxpayer being unable to reap the benefits of 
having the money in his pocket, money that was instead in the hands of the 
government. 
Withholding has proven to be the single most effective enforcement 
mechanism for collecting taxes on income from labor.52  The tax gap for 
amounts subject to withholding has consistently been measured at less than 
one percent.53  By contrast, the percentage of income not reported for 
amounts not subject to withholding, such as interest and dividends, is much 
higher.54
Despite the early resistance to withholding measures, after fifty years of 
its implementation, people are accustomed to wage withholding and most 
 
 
 46. Id. at 323. 
 47. Twight, supra note 22, at 374. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See I.R.C. § 6401 (2006) (defining overpayment of tax). 
 50. Id. § 6402 (reserving authority for the Secretary to make credits against a taxpayer’s 
liability or refunds of the balance, taking into account interest due); see also id. § 6414 
(setting extent of credits and refunds to withholding agents or employers for overpayment); 
Treas. Reg. § 301.6402 (2009) (detailing regulations for the administration of credits and 
refunds). 
 51. I.R.C. § 6611 (setting guidelines for when interest is due on credits and refunds); see 
also id. § 6621 (setting rate of interest to be paid). 
 52. Kahng, supra note 18, at 322. 
 53. Id. at 323 (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N 
1415 (REV. 4-96), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH:  INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX GAP 
ESTIMATES FOR 1985, 1988, AND 1992, at 8 tbl.3, 15 tbl.7 (1996)).  Professor Kahng also 
explains that this data was collected as part of a program that has been discontinued, and 
consequently this information is not available for recent years. Id. at 323 n.37.  The program 
was revived and renamed, and the National Research Program published tax gap data for 
2001, where the tax gap for income subject to withholding appears to be in a similar range. 
Id. at 322 (citing  Tax Gap Facts and Figures, supra note 17, at 11). 
 54. Twight, supra note 22, at 386 (noting that as of 1980, where withholding was in 
place, there was only a two to three percent rate of underreporting, but that rate increased to 
nine to sixteen percent underreporting when payments were not subject to withholding). 
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no longer question it as a legitimate way to enforce tax compliance.55  
Furthermore, because withholding has proven so effective in reducing the 
gap between the liabilities taxpayers owe and the taxes they actually pay, its 
use within the U.S. taxation system has been growing.  The withholding 
model for domestic income taxation previously mentioned provides the 
basic framework for the operation of withholding at the source in all of 
these systems.56  That is, the taxable portion of the payment is held by the 
payor and counts towards the amount of tax owed by the taxpayer.57
The withholding system of tax on foreign corporations and nonresident 
aliens is known as Chapter 3 of the Internal Revenue Code.
  
Essentially, it is an advance payment of tax before the taxpayer has a 
chance to use the money, or in this case, before the taxpayer has a chance to 
choose not to pay the tax owed. 
58  It is directed 
at the withholding agents that pay income to foreign persons, and details the 
persons responsible for withholding, the types of income subject to 
withholding, and the information return and tax return filing obligations of 
withholding agents.59  This chapter is the foreign tax equivalent of the 
income tax withholding for U.S. persons,60 and serves a similar purpose in 
that it preemptively withholds a certain percentage of tax due on U.S.-
source income in order to prevent tax avoidance by underreporting.61
Not all types of income are subject to such withholding, however.  
Section 871 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for the types of 
payments that are exempt from Chapter 3 taxation.
 
62  These include interest 
on deposits, percentages of any dividend paid by certain domestic 
corporations,63 income from foreign banks, and certain dividends paid by 
foreign corporations.64
The IRS has also implemented a system of backup withholding that acts 
as a safeguard when a taxpayer has failed to report some information and 
has been notified of that failure.
 
65  Backup withholding requires the payor 
to withhold a certain percentage of withholdable payments if:  the payee 
fails to give his Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) to the payor; the 
Secretary of the Treasury notifies the payor that the TIN is incorrect; there 
has been notified underreporting; or if the payee fails to certify properly that 
certain payments are not subject to withholding.66
 
 55. Id. at 392. 
  Backup withholding 
 56. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
 57. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 58. I.R.C. §§ 1441–1443, 1445, 1446 (2006). 
 59. Tax Withholding Types, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/international/article/0,,id=104910,00.html (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2011). 
 60. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 61. See I.R.C. §§ 3501–3510. 
 62. Id. §§ 871(i), 1441(c). 
 63. See id. § 871(i)(2) (referring to § 861(c) for requirements that must be met to be a 
qualifying domestic corporation). 
 64. Id. § 871(i); see also id. § 1441(c). 
 65. Id. § 3406. 
 66. Id. § 3406(a). 
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applies only to residents and resident aliens.67
Currently, our tax system still does not impose withholding on most 
investment income.
  Thus, this system provides a 
sort of assurance that certain amounts will be withheld when the taxpayer 
has already been notified of filing flaws. 
68  Professor Lily Kahng notes that this is not all that 
surprising, considering the history of objections to the extension of 
withholding by banks and corporations.69  Kahng explains that in 1982, 
Congress did try to enact dividend and interest withholding.70  However, 
banks and corporations complained that this withholding would unfairly 
shift the cost of collecting the tax from the government to them.71 After 
raising these complaints and organizing “protest mail” to Congress, in 
1983, the dividend and interest withholding measure was repealed 
retroactively without ever having taken effect.72
In the areas where it has been implemented, therefore, withholding has 
been an effective way to bring taxpayers into compliance by taking control 
of the amounts owed before they are actually paid to the taxpayer.  On the 
other hand, as it stands today, withholding on some investment income has 
been rejected primarily for policy reasons like unfairly shifting the costs of 
collecting tax from the government to banks. 
 
C.  Using Information Reporting To Close the Information Gap 
One of the core problems in enforcing tax laws comes from asymmetric 
information.73  That is, the taxpayer has knowledge of the relevant taxable 
transactions he is engaged in, and the government seeks to discover that 
information after the fact.74  In order to equalize this asymmetry, the 
government requires information from both the taxpayer and a third 
party75—usually an employer, financial institution, or other intermediary.76  
Unlike self-reporting alone,77
 
 67. This is true except when the status of the payee as a foreign person or U.S. person 
cannot be determined, in which case the payee is assumed to be a U.S. person subject to 
backup withholding. Tax Withholding Types, supra note 
 this appears to be effective in increasing 
59. 
 68. For an argument that the system should impose withholding on investment income, 
see Kahng, supra note 18. 
 69. Id. at 324–26. 
 70. Id. at 325–26. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  Professor Kahng contends that “adopting withholding on domestic investment 
income” might be an important part to “the solution of the international tax evasion 
problem” because it would signal commitment from the United States to other nations. Id. at 
341. 
 73. Lederman, supra note 25, at 1735. 
 74. Id. (citing Cords, supra note 26, at 1543–44). 
 75. Id. at 1735–36. 
 76. Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 605, 620 (2008). 
 77. Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps:  The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 & n.13 (2007) (quoting Charles P. Rettig, Nonfilers 
Beware:  Who’s That Knocking at Your Door?, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Oct.–Nov. 2006, at 
15, 15–16); see also Dean, supra note 76, at 620 (“When third-party information capable of 
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compliance.78  This is so for two reasons:  first, it gives the government a 
way of verifying the taxpayer’s returns, making noncompliance easier to 
catch; second, because taxpayers are aware that the government receives 
this information, they have little reason to falsify returns and so they report 
more honestly.79  Thus, in seeking to close the information gap, the U.S. 
has implemented a number of information reporting systems.80
This section highlights two of the information reporting systems created 
to equalize the asymmetry with respect to foreign accounts and transactions:  
the Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR)
 
81 and the 
Qualified Intermediary system.82  It then introduces Professor Leandra 
Lederman’s six-factor efficiency test for information reporting systems.83  
These current sources of foreign account information, along with the 
indicators of efficient information reporting systems, will shed light on the 
obligations and benefits of FATCA’s new requirements.84
1.  Raising the FBAR 
 
Until FATCA was enacted, and until it becomes effective, the IRS has 
primarily been tracking offshore accounts through a system of voluntary 
disclosure on the part of the taxpayer.85  Enacted under the Bank Secrecy 
Act (Title 31),86 FBAR requires the taxpayer87
 
verifying that reported by taxpayers is not available . . . self-reporting becomes far less 
reliable.”). 
 to report annually any 
 78. See Lederman, supra note 77, at 697–98 (noting that the use of third parties has been 
successful in achieving tax compliance, with a net misreporting percentage of only 4.5% 
(citing Rettig, supra note 77, at 15–16)). 
 79. See Dean, supra note 76, at 620 & n.99; see also Lederman, supra note 77, at 697 
(likening third party information reporting to “red light cameras, provid[ing] information to 
the government . . . that the taxpayer knows the government is receiving”). 
 80. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6011, 6041–6042, 6049, 6111 (2006) (requiring various types of 
taxpayer and third-party information reporting).  Professor Leandra Lederman details several 
other new and proposed third-party information reporting systems; these include reporting 
basis in securities transactions, reporting sales on online auction sites, and even the reporting 
of gifts by donees. See Lederman, supra note 25, at 1742–59. 
 81. See infra notes 85–93 and accompanying text. 
 82. See infra notes 94–107 and accompanying text. 
 83. See infra notes 113–22 and accompanying text. 
 84. See infra Part III.B. 
 85. In an ABA Section of International Law teleconference about the second Offshore 
Voluntary Disclosure Initiative, the question of whether FATCA is simply the new Report of 
Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) was answered in the negative; FATCA 
requires reporting of all foreign assets, and not just foreign accounts as required by FBAR.  
Furthermore, because FATCA is codified under a different title than FBAR, the enactment 
of FATCA will not displace taxpayers’ obligations under FBAR. Audio recording:  
Teleconference on 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative and Update on the Report 
of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) Guidance, held by the ABA Section of 
International Law (Mar. 16, 2011) (on file with Fordham Law Review). 
 86. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2006) (requiring individuals to report identities and 
relationships of parties involved in transactions with foreign financial entities); 31 C.F.R. 
§§ 103.24–27 (2010) (detailing persons and transactions subject to FBAR reporting); see 
also Mark Muntean, Mark Muntean on the Perils of the Foreign Bank Account Reporting 
Rules, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3726 (LEXIS), June 16, 2009. 
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foreign accounts exceeding $10,000 (in the aggregate).88  As previously 
mentioned, however, self-reporting standing on its own is ineffective.89  
Consequently, even with severe civil and criminal penalties for failure to 
comply,90 these reporting requirements were ignored for years.91
Enforcement of the FBAR is on the rise, however, and has been heralded 
as “vital . . . not only in carrying out criminal and tax investigations, but 
also in conducting intelligence activities to protect against international 
terrorism.”
 
92  In its ongoing effort to enforce FBAR compliance, the 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) continues to issue 
regulations intending to prevent taxpayers from avoiding compliance.93
2.  The QI Continuum 
 
In 2000, the IRS initiated the QI program to further enhance the 
information reported about foreign bank accounts.94  QIs are foreign 
intermediaries (usually financial institutions) that have entered into a 
withholding agreement with the IRS.95  The program was created with the 
intent of balancing the government’s multiple concerns—including having 
a system to routinely report income and withholding of the proper amounts, 
administering treaty benefits, meeting the obligations of information 
exchange agreements, and promoting foreign investment in the U.S.96  
Because of their direct relationship with account holders, QIs were seen as 
being in the unique position to collect the appropriate information and help 
the government achieve these goals.97
The system operates on a voluntary agreement between the financial 
institution and the IRS.
 
98
 
 87. This includes U.S. citizens and residents, as well as some foreign persons. See 
Muntean, supra note 
  The QIs withhold and report the appropriate 
86. 
 88. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314; 31 C.F.R. § 103.27(c); see also Muntean, supra note 86.  The 
obligation to file the report is triggered when a taxpayer checks the “yes” box on the IRS 
Form 1040, which asks whether the taxpayer has an interest in a foreign financial account. 
Muntean, supra note 86. 
 89. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 90. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5322; see also Muntean, supra note 86. 
 91. See Marsan, supra note 12, at 63–64. 
 92. Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR:  Where We Were, Where We Are, and 
Why It Matters, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 1, 2–3 (2006). 
 93. See Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Reports of Foreign Financial 
Accounts, 76 Fed. Reg. 10234 (proposed Feb. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 
1010). 
 94. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-99, TAX COMPLIANCE:  QUALIFIED 
INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM PROVIDES SOME ASSURANCE THAT TAXES ON FOREIGN INVESTORS 
ARE WITHHELD AND REPORTED, BUT CAN BE IMPROVED 3 (2007); Gary S. Wolfe, FATCA:  
Qualified Intermediary Reporting Requirements, IRS TAX AUDIT NEWS (July 23, 2010), 
http://gswlaw.com/irsblog/category/fatca/. 
 95. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e)(5)(ii) (2010); see also Wolfe, supra note 94. 
 96. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 9–10. 
 97. Id. at 12 (noting that the direct relationship between a Qualified Intermediary (QI) 
and account holders “may increase the likelihood that the QI will collect adequate account 
ownership information and be able to accurately judge whether its customers are who they 
claim to be”). 
 98. Id. at 10. 
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amount of tax on income from the United States heading to offshore 
persons.99  This entails determining the kind and amount of income, 
applying treaty benefits, and then calculating, withholding, and reporting 
these amounts to the IRS.100  Though it seems like a great burden on the 
financial institutions, these institutions do receive a significant benefit in 
exchange for their cooperation:  they may keep their client list private.101  
By contrast, nonqualified intermediaries (NQIs) must disclose their clients’ 
identities if they wish to be eligible for treaty benefits or other 
exemptions.102
In their study of the strengths and weaknesses of the QI program, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that its features do 
provide “some assurance” that foreign intermediaries calculate and 
withhold the proper amount of U.S. tax.
  Thus, under this system, the QIs are incentivized by the 
ability to retain the privacy of their customers’ identities, while the 
government benefits by receiving the correct amount of tax owed. 
103  The GAO report explains, 
however, that because the majority of the income leaving the United States 
goes through U.S. withholding agents, rather than QIs, identification issues 
arise from the fact that these entities are not subject to the same identity 
verification processes.104  Additionally, both U.S. withholding agents and 
QIs were often reporting transactions in unknown jurisdictions and 
payments to unknown recipients.105  In these situations, instead of 
withholding the default thirty percent, it was found that only two to three 
percent was withheld.106  The GAO recommended that the IRS determine 
why these entities failed to withhold the appropriate amount for payments 
to unknown jurisdictions, and take appropriate steps to recover the amounts 
due.107
The QI program appeared to be on the right track, incentivizing banks to 
withhold and report accurate amounts by allowing them to retain the 
 
 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  The treaty benefits in question are those that reduce the percentage of tax owed.  
The determination of eligibility for treaty benefits is often a complicated process.  Because 
treaty benefits are based on country of residence, QIs receive documentation from their 
clients declaring their residency. Id.  These might be passports, national health cards, or 
other qualifying documents under the “know your customer” rules established in the 
applicable jurisdiction. Id.  If sufficient documentation is not presented, the QI presumes that 
the client is ineligible and backup withholding would be imposed. Id.  But this is regulated 
separately from typical nonresident alien income and withholding, id., because the backup 
withholding provisions typically only apply to residents and resident aliens. See supra note 
67 and accompanying text. 
 101. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 11. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 33. 
 104. Id. (noting that U.S. withholding agents might rely on self-certified identity 
information forwarded by QIs and NQIs for their customers, and NQIs may not have 
rigorous processes for identifying account holders, resulting in a problem of unaudited 
documentation for those claiming treaty benefits). 
 105. Id.  Additional complaints about the QI program related to the IRS processing of the 
data received. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 34. 
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privacy their clients so desired.108
3.  Assessing Information Reporting Systems 
  The weaknesses identified by the GAO, 
however, were not adequately repaired in the years to follow, and abuses of 
the privacy incentive and the persistence of the information gap paved the 
way for the current “crackdown” on offshore tax evasion. 
Not all information reporting systems are the same.  As we have seen, 
systems like the FBAR that rely solely on taxpayers’ self-reporting have a 
tendency to be unreliable.109  Those like the QI program, while having a 
degree of “assurance” because of third party verification, still left loopholes 
that allowed transactions to go to “unknown jurisdictions.”110  Professor 
Lederman analyzed information reporting systems to discover what makes 
these systems efficient.111  Because information reporting imposes costs on 
the reporting party, she contends, it is not equally effective in all 
situations.112  In her analysis, Lederman identified six factors that are 
indicative of whether third-party information reporting will be efficient and 
effective.113
The first factor concerns the nature of the parties’ relationship, and 
questions whether the reporting party and the taxpayer are arm’s length 
parties.
 
114  This is important because information reporting tends to be 
more successful where there is a small chance of collusion.115  Lederman 
also notes that systems are even more successful where reporting parties 
receive a tax benefit that increases with the amount reported.116  Second, 
Lederman explains, information reporting is more likely to be efficient 
where bookkeeping infrastructure already exists.117  Third, Lederman looks 
to a centralization aspect; that is, an information reporting system will be 
more efficient where the number of parties reporting is exceeded by the 
number of parties on which they report.118  Fourth, Lederman explains that 
“complete” reporting is required for an effective system since all necessary 
information must be provided in order to match the third party’s report with 
the corresponding amounts on the taxpayer’s return.119  The fifth factor 
identified is the availability of few other alternatives to reporting in order to 
enforce the tax payment.120
 
 108. Id. at 12–13 (describing the facets of the QI system that provided “assurance that tax 
is properly withheld and reported”). 
  Lastly, Lederman looks to how much reporting 
 109. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 110. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 111. See Lederman, supra note 25, at 1736. 
 112. See id. (“[I]t matters who the reporters are, what they are reporting about, and how 
much information they include.”). 
 113. See id. 
 114. See id. at 1739. 
 115. See id. (explaining that chances of collusion are high when the parties are related). 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. at 1740. 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. at 1740–41. 
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on the proposed third party would contribute to the tax gap.121  This is 
because information reporting systems are most efficient where the amount 
at stake is great enough to justify the costs of administration of information 
returns.122
Though Lederman does not apply these factors to assess the efficiency of 
FATCA’s information reporting requirements, she notes that the factors are 
just as applicable to systems “addressing cross-border transfers.”
 
123  These 
factors will be applied to FATCA in Part III, and will highlight some of the 
ways in which FATCA differs from the systems Lederman describes.124
D.  Agreements Open Frequencies for Tax Information 
 
Apart from withholding and information reporting, the United States has 
taken part in a number of treaties designed to increase the sharing of 
taxpayer information so that tax laws may be enforced.  This section 
outlines the typical traits of such agreements and their place in the analysis 
of FATCA as a new enforcement mechanism. 
Though the United States purports to have authority to assert universal 
taxing jurisdiction (that is, over all individuals on all income worldwide), it 
has chosen to limit its taxation to U.S. persons’ worldwide income and to 
U.S. source payments to foreigners.125  Even with this limitation, the 
possibility of double taxation still exists between the U.S. and the foreign 
entity’s resident country.  In order to avoid the problems of double taxation 
resulting from two countries asserting jurisdiction over the same person or 
transaction, the United States has entered into tax treaties.126
In the absence of an income tax treaty, the United States imposes a thirty 
percent withholding tax on all payments to foreign entities or persons.
 
127  
But this entails the problem of potential double taxation—the payment is 
taxed once when leaving the United States, and taxed again as income in the 
“destination” country.128  Accordingly, nations reciprocally reduce tax rates 
so that the same income is not taxed twice.129
In addition, there are typically provisions for mutual exchange of 
information among nations regarding payments so that tax evasion is 
curbed.  However, some countries’ banking secrecy laws make them less 
willing to subvert their own laws to assist the United States in 
implementing its taxation regime.
 
130
 
 121. See id. at 1741.  For more on the tax gap statistics, see supra notes 
  Thus, information exchange 
17–19 and 
accompanying text. 
 122. See Lederman, supra note 25, at 1741. 
 123. See id. at 1736 n.15. 
 124. See infra Part III.B. 
 125. See PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION 178 (5th ed. 2005). 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. This is especially so in cases where the other country’s tax law has a different 
premise than the U.S. tax law does. Id. 
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provisions are lacking because they often require the United States to 
request information regarding specific persons, when the information that 
would allow them to know what to ask for is, by the terms of the agreement, 
unknown.131  This is why the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) has issued model tax treaties and model Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs).132
There are certain characteristics common to U.S. tax treaties.  First, there 
is typically a reduction in, or exemption from, tax on a reciprocal basis; the 
country of source will usually cede jurisdiction (in whole or in part) to the 
country of residence.
 
133  In addition, treaties seek to remove the possibility 
of double taxation in order to reduce barriers to investment in the United 
States by foreign country residents.134  Finally, the treaties make procedures 
to improve the administration of tax laws, to settle tax issues, and to provide 
for the exchange of information.135
E.  The Federation in Trouble 
 
The IRS has for many years been concerned about jurisdictions with 
favorable bank secrecy laws seen as “fostering tax avoidance and abuse.”136  
This issue was brought to the forefront with the case against the Union 
Bank of Switzerland (UBS) for conspiring to defraud the U.S. tax system 
by impeding IRS investigations.137  UBS was accused of “us[ing] a variety 
of secrecy tricks to help U.S. clients open foreign bank accounts and hide 
millions of dollars in assets from U.S. tax authorities.”138  The United 
States alleged that some UBS documents indicated that there were 52,000 
Swiss accounts owned by U.S. persons that had not been disclosed to the 
IRS.139  These accounts were estimated to contain about $18 billion.140
 
 131. See generally Richard E. Andersen, Analysis of U.S. Income Tax Treaties (RIA) 
¶ 24.01[1]. 
  
 132. See Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), OECD CENTRE FOR TAX POL’Y 
& ADMIN., http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3746,en_2649_33767_38312839
_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).  The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has thirty-four member countries as part of its forum 
for measuring and analyzing data about economic, social, and environmental change.  The 
OECD uses this information to predict future trends and to make policy recommendations to 
governments and other organizations around the world. See About the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, http://www.oecd.org (follow “About” 
hyperlink). 
 133. MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 125, at 178. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Payments Directed Outside the United States—Withholding and Reporting 
Provisions Under Chapters 3 and 4, 915-3d Tax Mgmt. Portfolio (BNA) § XXIX(B) (2010) 
[hereinafter Payments Directed Outside], available at TMFEDPORT No. 915 s XXIX 
(Westlaw); see also GORDON, supra note 34, at 3, 15. 
 137. See Payments Directed Outside, supra note 136, at § XXIX(B); see also United 
States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV, 2009 WL 2241122, at *1 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2009) 
(order denying motion to compel disclosure). 
 138. 156 CONG. REC. S1745 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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The case ended in a settlement.141  In the settlement agreement, “UBS 
admitted that it had participated in a scheme to defraud the United States of 
tax revenues, paid a $750 million fine, and agreed to stop opening accounts 
that are not disclosed to the IRS.”142
Since then, the IRS has identified foreign withholding and reporting as a 
Tier I (i.e., high risk) issue.
 
143  In response to these problems, and in 
seeking to close the tax gap, the Obama Administration has undertaken a 
multifaceted approach to “crack down” on tax evasion.144
II.  FATCA’S MISSION AND TACTICS 
  Among the 
legislative proposals intended to combat the loopholes left open from the 
tax treaties and QI reporting requirements were the Chapter 4 withholding 
and reporting requirements, otherwise known as FATCA. 
The FATCA provisions145 were enacted as a new approach to solving the 
unique enforcement problems presented by international taxation.146
 
 141. As part of the settlement, UBS was required to report income and other information 
about U.S. clients. See Settlement Agreement, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423-CIV 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/bank_agreement.pdf; 
see also I.R.S. News Release IR-2009-75 (Aug. 19, 2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=212124,00.html.  In addition, the IRS announced 
a voluntary disclosure program for U.S. persons who had not filed FBAR reports or reported 
income from foreign accounts. Lynnley Browning, 14,700 Americans Tell I.R.S. of Foreign 
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at B1.  By the end of this program, over 14,700 
persons had disclosed their secret foreign bank accounts, and 7500 agreed to “repatriate the 
assets and pay back taxes and interest as well as reduced penalties.” Id. 
  
 142. 156 CONG. REC. S1745.  Interestingly, Switzerland’s federal administrative tribunal 
determined that UBS did not have to give the IRS information regarding some of the 
accounts under the settlement agreement. See Swiss Court Halts Release of Some UBS 
Account Holder Data, J. ACCT. (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/
Web/20102540.htm.  While the question of the bank’s obligations under different nations’ 
conflicting laws is certainly an interesting and controversial one, it is outside the scope of 
this Comment. 
 143. See Payments Directed Outside, supra note 136, at § XXIX(B).  The IRS ranks the 
riskiest transactions within the Large Business and International (LB&I) Division through a 
tiering system. See Issue Tiering - LB&I, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=200567,00.html (last visited Apr. 
20, 2011).  Those transactions identified as Tier I “require[] a continued level of 
coordination across the enterprise” and are usually identified as such because they “[p]ose 
the highest compliance risk across multiple LB&I Industries and generally include large 
numbers of taxpayers, significant dollar risk, substantial compliance risk, or are high 
visibility.” Id. 
 144. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 145. These new foreign reporting and withholding provisions were originally introduced 
as FATCA in both houses of Congress in October 2009. See Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act of 2009, S.1934, 111th Cong.; see also Payments Directed Outside, supra 
note 136, at § XXIX(C).  After some significant revisions, which included delaying the 
effective date to January 1, 2013, and including a “grandfather” exception for existing 
obligations, the House of Representatives passed the bill in December 2009. See Payments 
Directed Outside, supra note 136, at § XXIX(C).  The “grandfather” exception refers to a 
clause that generally exempts certain transactions that exist before the new law takes effect. 
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 767 (9th ed. 2009).  The provisions were finally signed into 
law on March 18, 2010, under Title V of the HIRE Act. Hiring Incentives to Restore 
Employment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71.  The HIRE Act gives tax 
benefits to employers who hire certain previously unemployed workers. See id. §§ 101–102.  
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Earlier measures had failed in adequately detecting and deterring offshore 
tax evasion147 and left enough gaps to allow such grand schemes as seen in 
the UBS case.148  FATCA is intended to fill these gaps by taking a more 
active approach to information reporting, and thus creating a better system 
of detection, with great penalties to act as deterrents.149  Despite the 
obvious benefits of taking such a hard and fast approach to battling offshore 
tax evasion, efficacy is not the only concern; important foreign policy and 
economic policy choices are also implicated in this complex issue.150
A.  FATCA’s Prime Objective 
  The 
objectives of the provisions, as well as their application, give some 
indication of how they will affect U.S. international tax enforcement.  The 
following sections describe the purpose of the provisions. 
The principal goal of the FATCA provisions, as with any tax 
enforcement system, is to raise revenue.151  An estimated $100 billion in 
revenue is lost annually to offshore tax evasion.152  More specifically, 
however, FATCA seeks to “detect, deter and discourage”153 evasion of U.S. 
taxes through the use of foreign accounts and investment vehicles.154  
Because detection of evasion was one of the main downfalls of pre-FATCA 
tax enforcement, increased reporting requirements are designed to achieve a 
more integrated system of information so evasion can be more readily 
ascertained.155
 
This act intends to “help put Americans back to work” and “foster economic growth.” See 
156 CONG. REC. S1745.  The FATCA provisions were enacted as offsetting provisions to 
fund these exemptions. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act § 501 (falling 
under Title V which is entitled “Offset Provisions”).  The withholding and information 
reporting provisions discussed in this Comment are only some of the provisions enacted 
under Title V to combat offshore tax evasion.  Other provisions include, inter alia, requiring 
disclosure from U.S. taxpayers with foreign assets, the presumption that foreign trusts have a 
U.S. beneficiary in certain circumstances, and requiring the treatment of dividends from U.S. 
stock as income for non-U.S. persons. See id. §§ 511–522, 531–535, 541; see also 156 
CONG. REC. S1745.  However, a detailed discussion of these provisions is outside the scope 
of this Comment.  The FATCA provisions that are the focus of this Comment comprise what 
is now Chapter 4 of the IRC. See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act § 501 (to be 
codified at I.R.C. §§ 1471–1474). 
  This is because under the workings of existing treaties and 
 146. See generally GORDON, supra note 34 (describing characteristics of other nations’ 
tax systems that foster American tax evasion through offshore accounts). 
 147. International Tax Review, Chapter 4 of the FATCA:  Implementation Issues, Q&A, 
BRIGHTTALK (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.brighttalk.com/webcast/
23955&LS%3DEMS465283. 
 148. See supra Part I.E. 
 149. See 156 CONG. REC. S1745; see also International Tax Review, supra note 147. 
 150. See infra Part III. 
 151. International Tax Review, supra note 147 (noting that FATCA intends to “recoup 
needed revenue”); see supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 152. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY AND 
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES:  A BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF 2 
(2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/28/44431965.pdf. 
 153. International Tax Review, supra note 147. 
 154. Vlad Frants, FATCA Provisions of the HIRE Act:  Possible Effects on International 
Disclosure Norms, A.B.A. SEC. OF TAX’N NEWSQUARTERLY, Summer 2010, at 12, 12–13. 
 155. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 94, at 1. 
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information exchange agreements, it is often the case that information must 
be requested about specific persons or accounts.156  Without proper 
knowledge, the U.S. tax authorities cannot know what information to 
specifically request.157
In addition to aiding detection, FATCA seeks to deter future evasion of 
U.S. taxes.
  Thus, one of FATCA’s primary goals is to aid in 
early detection of offshore tax evasion. 
158  This is accomplished not by giving FFIs an incentive to 
report, but instead by giving them a disincentive for failure to report on 
their U.S. account holders.159  The “steep penalty” of thirty percent 
withholding for nondisclosure160 discourages FFIs from engaging in the 
kind of evasion-aiding behavior seen in the UBS case.161
Increased efficiency in detection of evasion and discouraging banks from 
using secrecy to aid evasion of U.S. taxes are thus the primary objectives of 
FATCA.
 
162  The provisions are geared to effectuate these results, albeit in 
an interesting new way.163  In so doing, however, they effectively ignore 
established policies underlying the pre-FATCA international taxation 
system and depart significantly from the “traditional” and typical usage of 
information reporting and withholding.164
B.  Resistance Is Futile:  FATCA’s Strategic Design 
 
FATCA’s operation is two-pronged, consisting of a reporting 
requirement component, and a penalty withholding component.165 These 
prongs are uniquely linked in that the withholding penalty is contingent on 
the reporting requirements being met.166  Essentially, FATCA requires a 
withholding agent to deduct and withhold a thirty percent tax on any 
withholdable payment made to an FFI167 or non-financial foreign entity 
(NFFE),168 unless certain reporting requirements are met.169
 
 156. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
  By having the 
 157. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text. 
 158. International Tax Review, supra note 147. 
 159. See infra Parts II.B, III.B. 
 160. 156 CONG. REC. S1745 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2010) (statement of Senator Carl Levin). 
 161. See id.; see also supra Part I.E. 
 162. Marsan, supra note 12, at 38. 
 163. See infra Parts II.B, III.A. 
 164. See infra Part III. 
 165. Marsan, supra note 12, at 40–45. 
 166. Id. at 40–41. 
 167. “Foreign financial institution” (FFI) is defined as any financial institution that is a 
foreign entity, including those that accept deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or 
similar business, as a substantial portion of its business, holds financial assets for the account 
of others, or is engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in 
securities. I.R.C. § 1471(d)(4)–(d)(5) (West 2010). 
 168. “Non-financial foreign entity” is defined as any foreign entity that is not a financial 
institution, but excepts corporations whose stock is regularly traded on an established 
securities market, any foreign governments, international organizations, foreign central 
banks of issue, and any class of payments identified as “posing a low risk of tax evasion,” 
among others. Id. § 1472(c)–(d). 
 169. The institution is required to report the name, address, taxpayer identification 
number (TIN) of the account holder, the account number, the account balance, and often the 
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information come from the foreign institutions holding the accounts (or 
owners in the case of NFFEs), the IRS would be able to verify the 
information from the taxpayers by using the information provided by the 
institution holding the account. 
There are several ways an FFI or NFFE can comply with the new 
regulations.  The first is to enter into an agreement with the Secretary to 
provide all necessary information about their U.S. accounts or substantial 
U.S. owners.170  By taking this route, the FFI can avoid the thirty percent 
withholding so long as it continues to comply.171  Second, the FFI can be 
deemed “nonparticipating” by not entering into such an agreement, and 
instead be withheld upon.172  However, this does not relieve the FFI of its 
reporting obligations.173  Third, the FFI may choose to be withheld upon 
rather than withhold on payments to recalcitrant account holders174 and 
nonparticipating FFIs.175  This means that the withholding would not only 
apply to payments to those parties, but would require the FFI to waive any 
rights under a treaty with respect to amounts deducted and withheld under 
the election.176  Finally, the FFI can elect to be subject to the same 
reporting requirements as a U.S. financial institution.177
 
gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments from the account. Id. § 1471(c)(1); see 
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment (HIRE) Act:  Law, Explanation & Analysis (CCH) 
¶ 305 [hereinafter HIRE Act].  The Treasury and IRS intend to issue regulations detailing the 
reporting of annual gross receipts and withdrawals for FFIs that do not currently track such 
data. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 35–36 (Apr. 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-34.pdf.  The regulations will likely include gross 
dividends, gross interest, other income, and gross proceeds from sales of property, to be 
determined according to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the FFI is located. See id. at 
35–38. 
  If it makes this 
election, the institution would be subject to Form 1099 reporting, but would 
not have to provide the account balance or value, or gross receipts and 
 170. I.R.C. § 1471(b)(1). 
 171. Id. § 1471(a)–(b). 
 172. Id. § 1471(b)(3). 
 173. HIRE Act, supra note 169, at 5. 
 174. See I.R.C. § 1471(b)(3).  “Recalcitrant account holder” is defined as any account 
holder that fails to comply with reasonable requests for the required information or that fails 
to provide a waiver of any foreign law that would prevent the reporting of the requested 
information. I.R.C. § 1471(d)(6).  This provision was intended to provide relief for FFIs that 
are unable to collect the necessary information to comply with the reporting requirements. 
I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 19.  However, it is not intended to provide a “permanent substitute 
for collecting and reporting information with respect to U.S. accounts.” Id.  Thus, the IRS is 
still considering what repercussions should apply in the case of long term recalcitrant 
account holders, including potentially cutting off FFI Agreements if there are still too many 
recalcitrant account holders after a reasonable period of time. Id.  The concern of choosing to 
be withheld upon instead of reporting the required information is reminiscent of the 
“loophole” seen in QI agreements, where QIs were simply reporting payments to unknown 
jurisdictions without withholding the proper amounts. See supra notes 105–07 and 
accompanying text. 
 175. I.R.C. § 1471(b)(3). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. § 1471(c)(2). 
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withdrawals from the account.178
1.  FATCA’s Withholding System 
  The primary factor encouraging the 
foreign entities to report, however, is still the avoidance of withholding. 
One of the biggest criticisms of FATCA—but also the most compelling 
reason for FFIs to enter into the desired information reporting agreement—
is the type of payments that are withheld upon.  Like Chapter 3 (also known 
as “substantive” withholding), the FATCA provisions also withhold upon 
payments such as interest, dividends, wages, and rents.179  Unlike the 
substantive tax, however, FATCA imposes withholding on gross proceeds 
from the sale or disposition of interest-producing properties from sources in 
the United States.180  This includes U.S. bonds, stocks, and other debt 
instruments.181
FATCA is not intended to impose an additional tax,
  Thus, these provisions impose a penalty tax on amounts 
that would not otherwise be subject to tax. 
182 but it does impose 
considerable burdens that make it appear like an additional tax.  This is 
primarily because of the types of payments subject to the withholding, but 
also due to its credit and refund provisions.  Like the Chapter 3 credits and 
refund provisions,183 if there has been an overpayment of tax in accordance 
with the substantive tax, the foreign entity may be entitled to a refund.184  
Indeed, these provisions are intended to function in the same manner as 
those under Chapter 3.185  In addition, they are intended to be consistent 
with U.S. obligations under income tax treaties,186 and therefore allow for 
credits and refunds for amounts overpaid if the taxpayer is eligible for treaty 
benefits.  This works in two ways:  there may be reduced withholding or 
exemption at time of the payment if proof of treaty entitlement is provided, 
or the entity may withhold and apply for refunds in order to get the treaty 
benefit.187
 
 178. HIRE Act, supra note 
  One Commentator has also noted that “if a payment is of an 
amount not otherwise subject to U.S. tax . . . the beneficial owne[r] of the 
payment generally is eligible for a credit or refund of the full amount of the 
169, at 7.  Form 1099 reporting refers to the requirement that 
anyone engaged in business making payments to U.S. persons over $600 report on these 
transactions. Id. at 2; see also I.R.C. § 6041. 
 179. The income sources listed in Chapter 3’s provisions reference I.R.C. § 871 and 
include interest (other than original issue discount), dividends, rents, salaries, wages, 
premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or 
determinable annual or periodical gains, profits and income.  This is income that is not 
connected with conducting a trade or business in the U.S. See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 180. Id. § 1473(1)(A) (West 2010). 
 181. Frants, supra note 154, at 13. 
 182. Bloomfield & Shamrakov, supra note 12, at 1. 
 183. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 184. Bloomfield & Shamrakov, supra note 12, at 2. 
 185. Dean Marsan, FATCA:  The Global Financial System Must Now Implement a New 
U.S. Reporting and Withholding System for Foreign Account Tax Compliance, Which Will 
Create Significant New Exposures—Managing This Risk (Part II), TAXES, Aug. 2010, at 27, 
88. 
 186. Id. at 90–94. 
 187. Id. at 98–100. 
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tax withheld.”188
By contrast, the interest due under Chapter 3 credits and refunds is not 
consistent.  Instead of a forty-five day grace period, the FATCA provisions 
provide a 180-day grace period during which no interest must be paid.
  These provisions appear to be consistent with the existing 
systems.   
189
2.  FATCA’s Information Reporting Requirements 
  
This is in essence an additional penalty because it does not afford to the 
foreign entities the time-value benefit of the money that was improperly 
withheld for an extended period.  Of course, the FFIs may avoid the 
withholding entirely by reporting on their account holders. 
The scope of information required under FATCA is great.  FATCA 
requires FFIs to report on foreign accounts owned by U.S. persons or U.S.-
owned entities.190  The FFIs would have to keep track and report not only 
when accounts are opened, but also throughout the “life” of the account.191  
This would include the gross receipts and withdrawals from the accounts, 
and is also likely to include transfers between accounts owned by the same 
person or relatives.192  NFFEs, on the other hand, would have to report their 
substantial U.S. owners, or alternatively, that they do not have such owners; 
these provisions set forth reporting exceptions for nonfinancial entities such 
as publicly traded corporations, among others.193
These requirements present some concern about duplicative information 
because they supplement existing obligations under QI agreements.
 
194  
Furthermore, though the IRS has provided some guidance as to how FFIs 
and NFFEs will need to identify beneficial owners of accounts and other 
entities, 195 the system remains “complex” 196
 
 188. Id. at 90. 
 and rather “‘burdensome in a 
way that is disproportionate to the benefit to be expected from these 
 189. Id. at 95. 
 190. Marsan, supra note 12, at 43. 
 191. Id.  Initial guidance indicated that FFIs would have to report the highest month-end 
balances. See I.R.S. Notice 2010-60, 2010-37 I.R.B. 329, 341.  Due to the high burdens 
associated with such periodic balance determinations, however, the Treasury and IRS intend 
to issue regulations limiting this reporting to year-end balances. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, 
at 34–35 (Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-34.pdf. 
 192. Marsan, supra note 12, at 43. 
 193. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 1472 (West 2010). 
 194. See I.R.C. § 1471(c)(3); see also Marsan, supra note 12, at 41.  The IRS indicated 
that they will “require[ ] all FFIs currently acting as QIs to consent to include in their QI 
agreements the requirement to become participating FFIs unless they qualify as deemed-
compliant FFIs under section 1471.” I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 39–40.  The Treasury and IRS 
intend to provide further guidance as to how this transition will work. Id. 
 195. The IRS has provided a five-step guide on how participating FFIs should identify 
existing individual accounts as U.S. accounts, recalcitrant accounts, or non-U.S. accounts. 
I.R.S. Notice 2011-34, at 3–19.  This guidance also provides for the kinds of documentation 
upon which an FFI may rely. Id. 
 196. See Alison Bennett, Financial Institutions:  IRS Unveils Eagerly Awaited FATCA 
Guidance, Practitioners Say Many Challenges Remain, 69 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) GG-1 
(Apr. 11, 2011).  
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rules.’”197
III.  FATCA AND THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF TAX ENFORCEMENT 
 Foreign entities and practitioners alike await further guidance 
from the IRS with respect to the details of the information reporting 
requirements. 
FATCA presents a new direction in U.S. tax law.  Though its goals of 
increasing revenue and bringing offshore tax evasion to a halt198 are 
arguably similar to regimes past,199
A.  Coercing Compliance by Withholding 
 the method for implementing those 
goals departs significantly from existing systems in three ways:  first, 
FATCA’s withholding system is used not to ensure tax collection, but as a 
means to coerce an information-sharing agreement; second, it seeks 
compliance by creating a disincentive for noncompliance where efficient 
information systems typically take an incentive-based approach; and third, 
its U.S.-focused approach to offshore tax evasion fails to consider the 
impact on existing tax treaties.  This part examines these departures from 
the norm and considers the potential impact of doing so. 
FATCA’s withholding differs significantly from other existing 
withholding systems in its usage.  Though the end goal is still to reduce the 
tax gap and collect revenue more effectively,200
Pre-FATCA withholding systems were designed to enforce tax payment 
by removing the time between receiving income and paying taxes.
 FATCA’s implementation 
forces reporting at risk of additional taxation, rather than solely enforcing 
taxation. 
201  This 
way, taxpayers would not have the opportunity to not file or pay appropriate 
amounts.202  Though this takes away the taxpayer’s time-value benefit of 
using income as it is received, Congress signaled its desire to make 
withholding a “fair” enforcement mechanism by offering refunds with 
interest for amounts overpaid.203
FATCA’s withholding most closely resembles backup withholding, as 
backup withholding also requires holding back a percentage of the 
taxpayer’s income if the taxpayer does not file certain information correctly 
(in this case, the TIN).
  Thus, withholding is typically used to 
collect taxes up front rather than coerce taxpayer action in another field. 
204
 
 197. See id. (quoting former Treasury international tax counsel Phil West). 
  However, even backup withholding differs 
significantly from FATCA because of who is designated to provide what 
kind of information.  In backup withholding, the payee withholds the 
amount from the taxpayer because the taxpayer has not properly provided 
 198. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 200. See supra notes 151–54 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 202. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text; see also Part I.B.1. 
 203. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
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his or her own TIN.205  By contrast, FATCA requires an agent to withhold 
an amount from the tax-paying FFI if the FFI does not file proper 
information about other persons (in this case, their customers).206
Furthermore, FATCA’s distinct failure to offer credit and refund 
provisions similar to those in other withholding systems
  Though 
FFIs usually collect certain information about their customers, the kind of 
information FATCA demands is often difficult to verify.  Not only does the 
information reporting impose the significant burden of determining the 
extent to which customer-provided information is accurate, it also imposes 
an up front thirty percent penalty for failure to do so.  This is a far cry from 
withholding a certain amount of a payment at the outset in order to prevent 
failures on the part of the taxpayer to file or set aside funds to pay taxes. 
207
Even though FATCA’s withholding system provides an innovative way 
to force FFIs into reporting on their customers—and in that way enhances 
the tracking of offshore accounts, and eventually leads to the ability to close 
the tax gap by some measure—its implementation may present an 
undesirable departure from the typical withholding system.  The 
undesirability arises from the indirectness of the link between purpose and 
effect.  If withholding is to be used as a method of enforcing tax 
compliance, its purpose is better served by remaining close to that goal 
directly and conforming to the identifying marker of withholding systems—
holding back from the taxpayer a percentage of taxes actually due.
 presents 
additional support for the proposition that this is not a withholding regime 
at all, but rather a penalty imposed at the outset.  It is certainly not in 
keeping with the notion that amounts withheld are intended solely to meet 
current tax obligations.  Rather, it imposes a sort of tax on FFIs that has 
little to do with taxes they actually owe (for those are already imposed and 
due), but has a lot to do with assisting the United States in enforcing its own 
laws. 
208  If the 
intent of Congress was to circumvent potential regulatory issues that come 
with placing a penalty on foreign entities by calling it a “withholding of 
tax” over which the United States has jurisdiction, those issues are not 
avoided here.209
 
 205. See supra notes 
  Utilizing the accepted mechanism of withholding to 
effectuate results for which withholding was not intended presents a stark 
problem for tax policy.  Because FATCA withholding does not conform to 
the standard layout of withholding systems generally, its implementation 
raises important new policy concerns that should be considered. 
66–67 and accompanying text. 
 206. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 207. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  By contrast, FATCA’s withholding 
threatens to hold back on financial institutions’ income that may not be subject to tax, or that 
may have already been reduced by treaty. See supra notes 62–64, 129, 180–81 and 
accompanying text. 
 209. Cf. Marsan, supra note 12, at 40–41 (noting the difficulty of creating a rule of law 
concerning foreign entities not subject to U.S. tax). 
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B.  FATCA’s Disincentive Decision and Inefficiency 
The disincentive in FATCA comes from imposing the thirty percent 
withholding by default, unless certain information is reported or an 
agreement is made with the IRS.210  FFIs are thus only forced to comply by 
being strongly discouraged, or even punished, for not complying. The 
necessity for this kind of approach is made quite clear because it deals with 
foreign entities.  Because some of these would-be reporting entities may not 
themselves be subject to U.S. tax, the information reporting cannot be 
demanded in a rule of law, but must instead be incentivized.211  However, it 
is not as clear why a disincentive, as opposed to an incentive, is used to 
achieve the goal of increased information reporting.212  While it is true that 
there is little incentive benefit that can be offered to a foreign entity that has 
no U.S. tax obligation—i.e., a foreign bank that receives investment income 
statutorily exempt from the substantive tax would have little reason to be 
forthcoming with customer information as there is no benefit to be 
offered—it is also true that creating a disincentive that imposes withholding 
on payments that are statutorily exempt from U.S. tax circles back to the 
same problems of a rule of law demanding information.  Thus, withholding 
is here once again used in a manner inconsistent with prior law:  it is being 
used to withhold on payments that are statutorily exempt from tax.213
In analyzing the efficiency of using withholding as a means to coerce 
information reporting, it is useful to recall Professor Lederman’s six-part 
framework because it enables a comparison to the characteristics that typify 
efficient information reporting systems.
  This 
is not only problematic from a policy perspective, but also potentially an 
inefficient means of achieving its end goal. 
214  The first question in the 
analysis is whether there is a potential for collusion; this question looks to 
whether the parties are acting at arm’s length.215  Lederman’s examples of 
parties not acting at arm’s length typically include family members or 
parties with other relations.216  Thus, in the case of the parties involved in 
FATCA, there would likely be little assumption of collusion between 
foreign banks and their clients.  This is not necessarily the case, however, 
especially in light of the allegations against UBS.  There, the bank 
representatives were accused of conspiring with their clients so as to avoid 
paying U.S. income tax.217
 
 210. See supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text. 
  Since, under Lederman’s analysis, information 
reporting is more likely to be effective where parties are acting at arm’s 
length, it is not entirely clear that this relationship is one that lends itself to 
efficient information reporting. 
 211. Marsan, supra note 12, at 40–41. 
 212. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 214. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 215. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra Part I.E. 
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Second, Lederman looks to the existing bookkeeping infrastructure.218
Lederman’s third factor is the “centralization” aspect, focusing on the 
number of parties reporting in relation to the number of parties reported 
upon.
  
In her examples, small shops are noted as types of businesses tending to 
lack the infrastructure necessary to have the information the authorities 
would need anyway.  Banks, on the other hand, have precisely this kind of 
infrastructure already in place.  Because of the well-known Know-Your-
Customer and European Anti-Money Laundering provisions, it is likely that 
most European banks would be abiding by some sort of client due 
diligence, even without the enactment of FATCA.  The burden on other 
countries, however, may be very different.  Here we might also wonder, 
then, whether the burdens of information collection and reporting would fall 
more heavily on certain countries than others.  Generally speaking, 
however, the targeted foreign entities of FATCA would likely be in the 
position to collect the information necessary. 
219  It is fair to assume here that there will be multiple accounts to 
each bank.  For example, in the UBS facts discussed above, approximately 
52,000 client accounts were undisclosed (and thus a relatively high ratio of 
taxpayers to reporters). 220
Fourth is the requirement that an effective system has access to all the 
necessary information in order to match the report with the taxpayer’s 
return.
 
221
The fifth characteristic, which provides that there are few alternatives to 
reporting in order to enforce the payment, is the most crucial.
  In this instance it is also likely that the FATCA requirements of 
the account holder’s name, and the account’s gross receipts and 
withdrawals would provide the necessary information.  Requiring the 
reporting of gross receipts and withdrawals eliminates the possibility that 
the taxpayer-account holder could average out the balance over the year to 
an amount approximating the amount on their tax return. 
222  It presents 
a tricky scenario, since information reporting systems are already in place 
under the Banking Secrecy Act and with respect to QI agreements. 223  In 
addition, there are information exchange agreements with most of the 
nations with which there are also tax treaties.  Were these information 
exchange agreements to be improved, it would not be necessary to impose a 
withholding penalty that claws back on treaty benefits in order to close the 
information gap.224
The sixth factor is the extent to which the imposition of this information 
reporting would contribute to closing the tax gap.
 
225
 
 218. See supra note 
  In the case of 
FATCA, the possibility of closing the tax gap is significant.  Billions of 
117 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 222. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra Part I.C.1–2. 
 224. See supra Part I.D. 
 225. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
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dollars are lost to unreported offshore accounts each year,226
Furthermore, Lederman notes that the systems where the reporting party 
is given a tax-reducing incentive to report are more effective.
 and while the 
possibility of tapping into that stream of account information would be 
costly to administer, it would reap great revenue in the end.  Since the tax 
authorities are placing the burden on the third parties to report, however, a 
default of thirty percent withholding makes this somewhat of a no-lose 
situation for the government.  If the party reports, the authorities gain that 
information about the account holder; if they fail to report on their clients’ 
accounts, the authorities have the time-value benefit of withholding thirty 
percent of that institution’s U.S.-source income until applicable treaty 
benefits are claimed, or until a refund application is submitted and granted, 
without worrying about having to pay interest to the institution. 
227
Thus, it would appear through Lederman’s analysis that FATCA’s 
withholding disincentive to not report may well be an effective way to 
collect information, but it may not be efficient. 
  The 
FATCA provisions, as explained, provide for a withholding default to force 
agreements with the IRS.  This kind of “incentive” may have a profoundly 
different result than if the IRS were to offer some sort of tax relief for 
providing the requisite information.  With that type of approach, it would be 
in the best interest of FFIs to seek to minimize their own liability by 
receiving the benefit of a tax reduction.  Though the default withholding 
provision also encourages minimizing tax liability by reporting, the FFI 
receives no benefit in the end, it simply avoids additional costs. 
C.  Set on a Collision Course with Existing Obligations 
FATCA’s withholding provisions, if not properly implemented, may 
have a severe impact on existing U.S. obligations toward foreign entities in 
jurisdictions with which the United States has tax treaties or TIEAs.228
First, although FATCA is not intended to impose additional tax over the 
amounts to which FFIs are subject under treaties, it ultimately may have 
that effect.  Currently, it is unclear how FFIs will be able to claim treaty 
benefits, and without proper administration the chances of over-withholding 
are great.  This presents a serious problem for the United States’ previous 
commitments to certain nations.
  
These provisions stand to draw back treaty benefits in two important ways:  
first, by imposing a higher rate of tax than that provided by treaty; and 
second, by not offering adequate credits and refunds to deal with 
overpayment of tax. 
229
 
 226. See supra note 
  The policy choices made in creating 
these treaties are undercut in favor of U.S.-centric legislation seeking 
foreign assistance in U.S. tax enforcement.  For example, the concerns for 
double taxation are blatantly overlooked when one considers that an FFI 
30 and accompanying text. 
 227. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra Part I.D. 
 229. See supra Part I.D. 
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may be paying a thirty percent tax where they only owe a five percent tax.  
Such disregard for standing income tax treaties sets a dangerous precedent 
for future legislation. 
Second, in the event such a case does occur—i.e., the FFI pays more tax 
than required by treaty—the credits and refunds provisions do not provide 
adequate remedy for over-withholding.230
CONCLUSION 
  Once again, the withholding 
systems currently in place acknowledge the importance of fairness by 
including interest in refunds for amounts over-withheld.  In the case of 
FATCA, where interest is often disallowed and the grace period for the IRS 
more than trebly extended, the penal nature of this withholding becomes 
more apparent.  In attempting to foster free exchange of information among 
nations, such coercive tactics may not be in the best interest for the long 
term. 
The new FATCA withholding and information reporting provisions take 
a hard stance against offshore tax evasion, and indicate very clearly the 
government’s intolerance for the use of offshore structures to subvert 
payment of U.S. taxes.  However, these provisions also impinge on a 
number of important policies that pre-date FATCA.  These include 
honoring income tax treaties that were formed to prevent a number of issues 
seen as fundamentally unfair, such as double taxation.  Further, fairness 
concerns are also implicated in the allocation of burdens.  FATCA imposes 
a great burden on FFIs that do not necessarily assist the taxpayer in evading 
U.S. tax, and the creation of the presumption that all FFIs do so is a 
fundamentally unfair one indeed.  Finally, the withholding tax penalty 
created for failing to meet the reporting requirements is a drastically 
different use of withholding from existing systems.  While existing systems 
use withholding as a preemptive means of tax enforcement, FATCA 
employs it as a coercive tool to force foreign banks into compliance with 
reporting obligations.  Without further guidance or revisions ameliorating 
the conflicts with pre-existing obligations, extending the concept of 
withholding from an accepted tax-enforcement mechanism to a punitive 
measure intended to harness otherwise out-of-jurisdiction foreign entities is 
both undesirable and unacceptable. 
 
 
 230. See supra notes 183–89 and accompanying text. 
